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ABSTRACT
Selecting the optimal set of countermeasures is a challenging task
that involves various considerations and tradeoffs such as priori-
tizing the risks to mitigate and costs. The vast majority of studies
for selecting a countermeasure deployment are based on a limited
risk assessment procedure that utilizes the common vulnerability
scoring system (CVSS). Such a risk assessment procedure does not
necessarily consider the prerequisites and exploitability of a specific
asset, cannot distinguish insider from outsider threat actor, and
does not express the consequences of exploiting a vulnerability as
well as the attacker’s lateral movements. Other studies applied a
more extensive risk assessment procedure that relies on manual
work and repeated assessment. These solutions however, do not
consider the network topology and do not specify the optimal po-
sition for deploying the countermeasures, and therefore are less
practical. In this paper we suggest a heuristic search approach for
selecting the optimal countermeasure deployment under a given
budget limitation. The proposed method expresses the risk of the
system using an extended attack graph modeling, which considers
the prerequisites and consequences of exploiting a vulnerability,
examines the attacker’s potential lateral movements, and express
the physical network topology as well as vulnerabilities in network
protocols. In addition, unlike previous studies which utilizes attack
graph for countermeasure planning, the proposed methods does
not require re-generating the attack graph at each stage of the pro-
cedure, which is computationally heavy, and therefore it provides a
more accurate and practical countermeasure deployment planning
process.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years we have witnessed a rapid growth in the number
of vulnerabilities discovered in popular systems and applications.
When thousands of vulnerabilities revealed every month, risk man-
agement procedures must be performed automatically and continu-
ously.
A traditional information security risk management process in-
cludes three main phases: identification, assessment and treatment.
The identification phase begins with identifying system assets (e.g.,
databases, servers, data, applications, and network elements). Next,
the threats to these assets should be explored (e.g., unauthorized
access, misuse of information, loss of data). When exploring system
threats, it is essential to consider both an internal and external
threat actors. The last step in this phase is monitoring the system
and assets in order to identify security vulnerabilities.
In the assessment phase, the identified assets, threats and vul-
nerabilities are aggregated into attack paths that an attacker can
take in order to compromise a system asset (i.e, a realization of
one or multiple threats). For each attack path, both the impact to
the system (i.e., the damage caused when successfully exploited)
and the likelihood (probability) of occurrence should be determined.
This probability is usually determined by considering the prereq-
uisites and consequences of exploiting security vulnerabilities, as
well as the attacker’s potential lateral movements. These two met-
rics define the risk for a given attack path, which is essentially the
product of likelihood and impact. The outcome of this phase is the
attack surface of the system, which is represented by the different
attack paths a threat actor can take to compromise system assets.
The overall risk of the system is calculated by accumulating the
risk introduced by all attack paths in the attack surface.
The treatment phase involves prioritizing and implementing the
appropriate security countermeasures for reducing the risk of the
system. Since eliminating all of the risk is impractical, an optimal
countermeasure deployment should reduce the risk to an acceptable
level with a given allocated budget. The outcome of this phase is
usually a prioritized list of countermeasures, and the residual risk
in the system after implementing those countermeasures.
Previous works for selecting the optimal countermeasure de-
ployment can be classified into two main approaches. The first ap-
proach utilizes the common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS)1
(e.g., [18]), which provides for each vulnerability a score reflect-
ing its severity. The score is derived from the exploitability (e.g.,
attack complexity, required privileges) and impact of the vulnera-
bility (i.e., compromising confidentiality, integrity, or availability).
This approach, however, ignores the prerequisites for exploiting a
vulnerability (e.g., a port that should be open in the organization
firewall); does not consider the attacker lateral movement as well
as the potential involvement of a vulnerability in multiple attack
paths; and does not distinguish internal from external threat actors.
Therefore, although the main benefit of this approach is its effi-
ciency (calculating the accumulated risk in a system using CVSS is
very fast); a countermeasure selection process which is based solely
on CVSS cannot produce an optimal countermeasure deployment,
since it is based on a limited risk assessment method.
The second approach utilizes attack graphs (e.g., [3, 10, 16]). An
attack graph is a structured representation of the relationships
between vulnerabilities and system assets, and between different
vulnerabilities. Attack graphs (e.g., logical attack graph) can also
1CVSS: https://www.first.org/cvss
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represent the prerequisites and consequences of vulnerabilities, as
well as the attacker’s potential lateral movements (see Section 2
for more details). When generating an attack graph, the identified
security vulnerabilities are aggregated into attack paths, which
specify the actions a threat actor can take in order to compromise
system assets. Using attack graphs, the risk can be evaluated with
respect to specific assets and threat actors. Hence, a risk assessment
method that is based on attack graph is more accurate. However,
the computational complexity for generating an attack graph is
polynomial with the size of the network and the number of vulnera-
bilities, thus generating an attack graph is a highly time consuming
task. Therefore, while a countermeasure selection process that is
based on attack graphs can potentially provide an optimal counter-
measure deployment, a naive implementation of such process on
which the attack graph is re-generated at every step of the selection
process is not practical. In addition, current methods for counter-
measure selection that are based on an attack graph modeling are
limited because they do not consider the network topology nor
vulnerabilities in network protocols.
In this paper, we suggest a heuristic method for selecting, given
a budget limitation, the optimal countermeasure deployment. The
optimal countermeasure deployment is defined as the set of counter-
measures, which minimizes the risk of the system within budgetary
limitation. In the proposed methods, the risk to the system is repre-
sented using an enhanced attack graph model, which in addition
to software vulnerabilities considers physical network topology
and vulnerabilities in network protocols. The benefit of using this
model is three-fold. First, it provides an accurate representation
of the risk to the system, which considers attacks on network pro-
tocols (such as ARP spoofing, DNS spoofing and SYN flooding).
Second, it support advanced types of communication such as wire-
less communication, and thus it can be used to model cyber-attacks
on networks that include IoT devices. Third, it allow us to consider
the network positions of each countermeasure.
In order to find the optimal countermeasure deployment effi-
ciently, we model the problem as shortest path finding problem,
designed an admissible heuristic to reduce the search space, and
used the A* solver to find an optimal solution. Because re-generating
the attack graph at each iteration of the search process is impracti-
cal, we introduce the notion of risk equation i.e., the risk introduced
by exploiting an asset, together with possible countermeasures that
can eliminate this risk; which enables us to evaluate the risk of
the system under different countermeasure deployments without
re-generating the attack graph. For these reasons, the proposed
method provides a more accurate and efficient countermeasure
deployment planning process.
2 ATTACK GRAPHS
An attack graph a structured representation of the vulnerabilities
present in the system and their interactions with each other or
system assets. A graph-based network vulnerability analysis was
first introduced by Philips and Swiler in 1998 [13]. In their proposed
model each node in the graph represents a possible attack state
(which is a combination of the current state of the host, the attacker
access level, and effects of the attack so far), while edges represent
an action that causes a change in the state (for example, the attacker
exploits another vulnerability). In the following decade the research
on attack graphs focused mainly on enhancing the underlining
models so that attack scenarios can be represented more accurately
and efficiently [6, 7, 11, 17] as well as enhance existing attack graph
models with defenses [1, 2, 9, 15].
In this research we opt to use the MulVAL (a logic-based secu-
rity analyzer) reasoning engine [12], which is a popular, publicly
available, easy to use, and extendable attack graph analysis tool.
MulVAL uses the Prolog language to represent the pre- and post
conditions for exploiting a vulnerability, which allows straight for-
ward countermeasure modeling and their automatic association to
attack steps. MulVAL2 models the interactions between software
bugs and network configurations and automates information gath-
ering by deploying host-based scanners. An example of an attack
graph generated by MulVAL is presented in Figure 2. MulVAL mod-
els this information using the Datalog language [12], which is a
subset of the Prolog logic programming language.
Datalog consists of predicates – atomic formulas of the form:
p(t1, ..., tk )
where, each ti can be: (1) a constant (starting with a lower-case), (2)
a variable (starting with an upper-case), or (3) a wild card ("_"). For
example, the following predicate states that the attacker (attacker)
can execute code in dbServer under some permissions (Perm).
execCode(attacker ,dbServer , Perm).
Predicates are used to construct rules that are represented using
Horn clauses as follows:
P0 : −P1, ..., Pn
which are translated as: "if the predicates P1, ..., Pn are true, then
predicate P0 is also true". The left part of the clause (P0) is called the
head and the right part (P1, ..., Pn ) is called the body. Rules with no
body are called facts. For example, the following rule indicates that
a principal can use some host (SrcHost) to access another (DstHost)
via network using a specific protocol (Prot) and port (Port, if he/she
has a local access to SrcHost and both host-based and network-
based access controls allows the communication (aclH and aclNW
predicates).
netAccess(Pr incipal, SrcHost, DstHost, Prot, Por t ) : −
localAccess(Pr incipal, SrcHost, SrcU ser ),
aclH (SrcHost, SrcU ser, SrcHost, DstHost, Prot, Por t ),
aclNW (SrcHost, DstHost, Prot, Por t ).
MulVAL’s logical attack graph is defined as:AG = (Nr ,Np ,Nd ,E,L,G).
There are three node types: derivations (Nr ), primitive facts (Np ),
and derived facts (Nd ). Derivation nodes correspond to rules and
represent the logic for a fact to become true (visualized as circles);
primitive facts correspond to the inputs describing the specific sys-
tem (visualized as rectangles); and derived facts) are the results of
applying rules on the primitive facts (visualized as diamonds).
An edge e ∈ E can connect between a primitive or derived fact
and a derivation (e ∈ {(Np ∪ Nd ) × Nr }), or between a derivation
and a derived fact (e ∈ {Nr × Nd }).
The derivation nodes imply an and relation between their in-
coming nodes, which indicate the preconditions for performing
2MulVAL tool: http://www.arguslab.org/software/mulval.html
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the corresponding actions. The derived fact nodes, on the other
hand, imply an or relation between their incoming nodes, which
represent the various ways that lead to the same consequence.
The attack graph also consists of a mapping between nodes and
their labels, i.e., the predicates they represent (L), and the node
representing the attacker’s goal (G).
Attacks are simulated by querying the Datalog program, which
is a collection of facts and rules describing a specific system, for the
predicate representing the attacker’s goal. For example, querying
for execCode(attacker ,dbServer , root), will indicate whether the
attacker can execute code with root privileges on dbServer. The
attack graph is constructed based on the trace generated by this
query, as described by Ou et al. in [11].
3 RELATEDWORK
One approach for countermeasure selection is to recommend miti-
gation for specific events, as presented by Cuppens et al. [4]. They
suggest a decision support system to assist security administrators
in selecting appropriate countermeasures, which is implemented
as part of an intrusion detection system (IDS). The system holds a
repository of previously observed attacks and countermeasures that
are represented in LAMBDA (LAnguage to Model a dataBase for De-
tection of Attacks) – a generic language used to describe attacks in
terms of pre and post conditions. Countermeasures are represented
in LAMBDA as follows: the pre-condition represents a system state
that requires to apply the countermeasure and the post-condition
which is the system state after applying the countermeasure (usu-
ally the negation of the pre-condition). The authors defined the
concepts of correlation and anti-correlation. Two instances are cor-
related if the post-condition of one supports the pre-conditions
of the other (i.e., these instances represent attack steps in a mul-
tistage attack scenario). Two instances are not-correlated if the
post-condition of one contradicts the pre-conditions of the sec-
ond (i.e., one instance represents a countermeasure that prevents
the other instance that represents an attack). The countermeasure
recommendation process is triggered by alerts raised by the IDS.
Upon an alert, future attack steps are identified by searching the
repository for correlations, while countermeasures are identified
by searching for anti-correlations.
In this work, we use LAMBDA for the representation of miti-
gation actions. The structure of LAMBDA (i.e., the pre and post
conditions) is very similar to MulVAL’s attack graph modeling,
which also represents attacks according to pre and post conditions
(see Section 2). Thus, enables easy representation and mitigation
actions to attack graph nodes matching (see Subsection 5.1).
Other approaches suggest selecting a countermeasure plan to
reduce the global risk in a system, and not just to mitigate a specific
event. Viduto et al. [18] presented an approach for recommending
efficient countermeasure set in terms of both cost and risk. Their
approach is divided into two parts: (1) risk assessment process that
results in an initial countermeasure set, and (2) an optimization
process that refines the selected set using amulti-objective optimiza-
tion algorithm (Tabu-search). The risk assessment process consists
of 11 steps, during which: the organization’s assets are identified
and scanned for vulnerabilities and existing exploits; vulnerabilities
are mapped to their impact based on their CVSS scores and are
matched to threats identified in the organization; a likelihood table
is computed to indicate the probability for a threat to materialize
given that the attacker exploited a vulnerability; finally, the total
risk in the system is computed and an initial countermeasure set
ids selected from a predefined generic list. In the second phase of
their approach, the initial countermeasure set is used as the initial
state to the heuristic multi-objective Tabu search algorithm, which
finds a countermeasure set that minimizes both the countermea-
sures implementation cost and the risk in the system. Although
their approach is designed to consider the two major aspects in
countermeasure selection, the mitigated risk mitigated and and
cost, the risk assessment process is mostly manual and requires
experts’ knowledge.
Unlike Viduto et al. , we follow previous works that suggested
automating the risk assessment phase by using attack graphs.
Kijsanayothin and Hewett [8] presented an analytical approach
for using attack graphs for network protection. Their approach
chooses the most preferred countermeasures to eliminate attack
paths using CP-Net (a graphical model for representing qualita-
tive conditional preference relationship among decision variables).
However, it cannot provide a recommendation that satisfies a given
budget. Moreover, they don’t consider the amount of risk each
countermeasure mitigates.
Santhanam et al. [16] used preference graph to generate the
most preferred and effective (in terms of attack paths elimination)
countermeasure strategy. They introduced the C3I-net (credibility-
constrained conditional importance network), which is based on
the CI-net (conditional importance network) – a language for rep-
resenting ordinal preferences over a set of goods. In their approach,
the C3I-net is converted to a preference graph, which enables to
iteratively discover the most preferred strategies. The effectiveness
of each strategy is evaluated by generating an attack graph accord-
ing to its effect. If the attacker’s goals are satisfied, the strategy is
considered effective. The optimal solution is the first discovered
strategy that is also effective.
Chung et al. [3] presented the network intrusion detection and
countermeasure selection (NICE) framework. NICE is a multi-phase
distributed vulnerability detection, measurement, and countermea-
sure selection mechanism aimed at preventing virtual machines
(VMs) in a cloud from being compromised. The authors used a
variation of MulVAL for generating the attack graph that is able
to represent IDS alerts. The attack graph is generated based on
vulnerabilities discovered in offline or online scans and the alerts
raised, and is regenerated upon the discovery of new vulnerabilities
or countermeasure deployment. Similar to [4] et al. , countermea-
sures are selected per alert from a predefined countermeasures pool.
However, in this work, the probability of vulnerability exploitation
(based on its CVSS base metric) is taken into consideration. Upon
an alert, the probabilities of the corresponding node and the rest
of the nodes in the path to the goal are updated. Based on these
probabilities, the benefit of deploying each suitable countermeasure
is calculated. Finally the optimal countermeasure is selected based
on the return on investment (ROI) metric.
Gonzalez-Granadillo et al. [5] used the return on response in-
vestment (RORI) metric, which indicates the gain earned by imple-
menting a countermeasure (i.e., response) relative to its cost, and
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introduced its stateful version (StRORI) that includes considera-
tion in the system’s state at the time of evaluation. The authors
present a mitigation model to handle ongoing and potential attack,
which has two operation modes. The first is the preventive mode,
during which an initial set of countermeasures is created based
on attack graph nodes coverage. The second is the reactive mode,
during which the risk associated with each attack graph node is
updated based on reports of real attacks identified in the system,
and new countermeasures are selected (based on the StRORI metric)
and enforced.
Kotenko and Doynikova [10] defined a method for countermea-
sure selection that utilized attack graph-based metrics. The attack
graph used by their method is [7]. Their method is based on many
open standards (e.g., CVE, CVSS) and relies on existing countermea-
sures, such as firewalls and IDS, to provide information regarding
security events. Similar to [3, 4], the recommendations are event-
driven (i.e., the countermeasure selection process is triggered by a
security event). An attack graph is generate, based on the various
information sources, to represent the system’s security state. Upon
an event, attacker and attack related metric, (such as: attack proba-
bility, attacker skills, and attack impact) are calculated based on the
attack graph. Then, a countermeasure index is computed for each
countermeasure, which reflects its benefit in light of the expected
losses, and the countermeasure with the maximal index value is
selected. To measure the countermeasure effectiveness, the attack
probability metric is recalculated, which requires to modify the
attack graph accordingly.
Table 1 summarizes the similarities and differences of the above
mentioned methods and our approach. We examine the works
based on their definition of countermeasures (generic, e.g., use
firewall of some brand, or specific actions, e.g., update a specific
rule in a specific firewall instance), countermeasure-vulnerability
matching method, and countermeasure selection considerations
(minimizing the risk in the system, minimizing deployment cost,
operator preferences, risk introduced by the countermeasure, and
in which position should the countermeasure be placed). Each of
these works addressed one or more major considerations, however
non of them provided an holistic solution to provide a detailed
countermeasure plan that meets the organization’s requirements.
Moreover, most of the works manually matched countermeasure to
vulnerabilities, or didn’t provide any details regarding their method.
We aim to provide a method for constructing a countermea-
sure plan that: (1) is specific as possible (i.e., specifies where to
deploy/perform each countermeasure/mitigation action), (2) meets
the organization’s budget, (3) corresponds as much as possible to
the operator’s preferences, and (4) minimizes as much as possible
the risk in the system. The risk introduced by countermeasures is
not considered within the scope of this work. In addition, unlike
previous works, we distinguish between mitigation actions and
countermeasures and consider them both. This enables an efficient
countermeasure-vulnerability matching as will be described in the
following sections.
4 MITIGATION ACTION AND
COUNTERMEASURE MODELING
4.1 Overview
In this work, we define countermeasures as specific security prod-
ucts (e.g., Palo Alto Firewall) that are mainly characterized by two
attributes: the defense mechanism they implement and the set of
mitigation actions they provide. A defense mechanism defines a
family of security products (e.g., Firewall, antivirus). Mitigation
action, on the other hand, is a specific functionality that is provided
by the countermeasure and is not associated with a specific secu-
rity product (e.g., update a Firewall rule to disable/enable specific
communication).
Note that a security breach can be eliminated by different mitiga-
tion actions. For example, code execution due to vulnerability in a
local program could be eliminated by both patching the vulnerable
program or installing an anti-virus to prevent it. The categorization
of countermeasures in both general (defence mechanism) and spe-
cific (mitigation action) attributes allows more efficient matching
process between security issues and countermeasure.
The following sections provide detailed description of the coun-
termeasures and mitigation actions modeling. Moreover, Section 4.2
presents a methodology for defining specific mitigation actions
based on MulVAL attack graph modeling.
4.2 Mitigation action
Our modeling of mitigation actions is inspired by LAMBDA [4],
and consists of the following fields:
• ID – unique identifier.
• Countermeasure type: the defense mechanism correspond-
ing to the mitigation action.
• Action – description of the mitigation action.
• Post-conditions – the cancelled conditions and side-effects
of applying the action.
• Pre-conditions – the conditions that must be met in order to
apply the action.
• Position – pointer to the location of the new security product
in the network.
The pre- and post-conditions are represented by the same Prolog
predicates that are used to generate the attack graph. The primary
post-condition represents the fact that is cancelled by the mitigation
action (thus it is written in negation). Other post-conditions are op-
tional and represent the “side-effects" of performing the mitigation
action. The pre-conditions represent the conditions that must hold
in order to perform the mitigation action. We chose to represent the
mitigation actions’ pre- and post-conditions using Prolog predicates
in order to be able to automatically match them with each attack
graph node, and also to use the corresponding query traces to infer
the network position that the mitigation action should be applied.
Examples for specific mitigation actions representation is presented
in Appendix A. Following is a description of a methodology for
modeling mitigation actions based on a given Prolog program (i.e.,
attack graph modeling).
4.2.1 Modeling Methodology. The process of defining mitigation
actions is illustrated in Figure 1. First, defense mechanisms are
enumerated in order to create a general set of remedies (denoted
4
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Table 1: Comparison with previous works.
Work CM Definition CM Identification AG AGre-gen.
Considerations
Risk Min. Cost Pref. CM Risk Pos.
Cuppen et al. [4] Depends on theLAMBDA spec.
Search for anti-correlation in
the IDS alerts DB ✓
Viduto et al. [18] Generic Predefined mapping ✓ ✓ ✓
Santhanam et al. [16] Mitigation action – ✓ ✓ ✓
Gonzalez-Granadillo et al. [5] – – ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
Kijsanayothin and Hewett [8] Mitigation action – ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
Chung et al. [3] Generic – ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Kotenko and Doynikova [10] Mitigation actions Predefined mapping ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Our approach Mitigation action / CM Automatic (Prolog reasoning) ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
CM = Countermeasure AG – use attack graph for risk assessment
AG re-gen – whether the attack graph is regenerated each time the risk is assessed Risk Min. – minimizes the risk in the system
Cost – minimizes the cost of the plan Pref. – select countermeasures with regard to the operator preferences
CM Risk – consider the risk introduces by countermeasures Pos. – consider the deployment position of the countermeasure in the system
by DM), which are then associated with all of the predicates they
can eliminate. Note that DMpi is the set of defense mechanisms
that can eliminate the fact represented by predicate pi . In this work,
we consider the following defense mechanisms: firewall (host and
network based), software patch, antivirus software, and intrusion
prevention system (host and network based).
Next, the conditions that enable the existence of the facts repre-
sented by the predicate pi are identified. We distinguish between
two cases: (1) primitive predicates or predicates that are derived by
only one rule (referred to as single-rule predicates) and (2) predi-
cates that are derived by multiple rules (referred to as multi-rule
predicates). Predicates of the first case represent only one possible
scenario, thus we consider only the pre-conditions of the defense
mechanism. For example, vulHost is a primitive predicate that indi-
cates the existence of a specific vulnerability in a specific program
running in some host:
vulHost(Host ,VulID, Proдram,Ranдe,Consequence).
Avulnerability can be handled by two defensemechanisms from our
set: software patch or network-based IPS. Each of them requires
that there exists a patch/IPS rule that can identify the specific
vulnerability (denoted by VulID).
Predicates of the second case might represent more than one
possible scenario that leads to the same consequence. In this case,
all of the rules are first grouped by their pre-conditions such that
the rules in each group (denoted by дpij ) represent similar scenarios.
Each group is a candidate for a mitigation action, and the set of
common pre-conditions is part of the corresponding mitigation
action’s pre-conditions. For example, aclNW is a predicate that
describes network communication:
aclNW (SrcHostOrSubnet ,DstHostOrSubnet , Protocol , Port).
This predicate describes four different types of communications:
(1) between two hosts (inside the same subnet or between subnets);
(2) between two subnets; (3) between a specific host and an entire
subnet; and (4) between an entire subnet and a specific host. Thus,
the rules deriving the aclNW are divided into four groups, which
can be cancelled by a network-based firewall. Note that the post-
condition for each predicate pi is the predicate itself (i.e., the fact
that is cancelled by the mitigation action).
Figure 1: Mitigation action definition methodology.
Finally, mitigation action instances are created from the combi-
nation of the previously extracted scenarios and the defense mech-
anisms that can eliminate them. Note that for defense mechanism
that requires installation (e.g., firewall or IPS) two mitigation ac-
tions are created – for the case that the defense mechanism should
be installed (in this case another pre-condition is added to indicate
that it is not installed yet) and for the case that it is installed and
needs to be updated (in this case another pre-condition is added to
indicate that the defence mechanism exists). A detailed example of
defining mitigation actions for the vulHost and aclNW predicates
is given in Appendix A.
Mitigation actions also contain a specification of how to extract
the network position where to deploy the defense mechanism from
the corresponding query trace. The deployment position can be one
of the following: (1) the vulnerable host (e.g., installing an HIPS or
patching a program; (2) an existing security product (e.g., updating
a firewall rule or an NIPS); and (3) a network position (e.g., when
installing a new firewall to separate two existing subnets).
4.3 Countermeasures
Countermeasures are characterized by more technical details re-
garding security products such as: cost, manufacturer, and are as-
sociated to the set of mitigation actions they support. Each product
can support one or more mitigation actions and consists of the
following fields:
• ID – unique identifier.
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• Manufacturer – the name or identifier of the manufacturing
company (e.g., Cisco).
• Product ID – the name or identifier of the specific product
of the manufacturing company (e.g., Snort).
• Deployment Cost – the cost of the product and the deploy-
ment expenses.
• Coin – the currency of the deployment cost value (e.g., USD).
• Mitigation Action IDs – list of mitigation action id’s sup-
ported by the product.
The modeling of new countermeasures is based on market re-
search. New countermeasures are added if new products appear
on the market. The products modeled must provide one or more
mitigation actions. Note that new types of security products can
also lead to the creation of new mitigation actions. In light of our
modeling method, by modeling mitigation actions and countermea-
sures from a group of existing security product types, we prevent
the creation of imbalance between the two.
5 RISK ASSESSMENT
Before executing the search to find a cost-effective countermeasure
plan, a risk assessment process should be conducted in order to
estimate the current state of the system and understand what are
the options to enhance it. We chose to perform an attack graph-
based risk assessment approach; more specifically we chose to use
MulVAL [12] with our extended network modeling3.
The following subsections describe how relevant countermea-
sures are identified based on the generated attack graph, and and
alternative representation of the attack graph, which also incor-
porate the relevant countermeasures, that allows more efficient
calculation of the system’s risk under the deployment of a specific
countermeasure plan.
5.1 Identifying Relevant Countermeasures
Countermeasures identification is a two steps process that is based
on matching mitigation actions to the attack graph nodes. The mit-
igation action matching process is also based on Prolog reasoning,
similar to the attack graph generation [12]. Note however, that the
Prolog program used for this task is slightly different than the one
used to construct the attack graph.
The Prolog program for mitigation action matching consists
of the input used to generate the attack graph (i.e., facts about
the system) and a set of rules that represent the various mitigation
actions. Each mitigation action (as defined in Section 4) is converted
into a rule in the following format:
Postcondition : −Precondition1, ..., Preconditionn (1)
where Postcondition corresponds to the predicate that the miti-
gation action eliminates, with an additional argument to indicate
the mitigation action ID:
p(t1, ..., tn ) ⇒ p(MAID, t1, ..., tn ) (2)
The preconditions on the other hand, remain the same as in the
mitigation action description. For example, consider the following
predicate, which represents that a communication (using protocol
3Reference removed not to break the anonymity.
Table 2: Examples of countermeasures.
Countermeasure Mitigation action Position Notation Cost($)
Host-based firewall update rule dbServer C1 20
Network-based firewall install new compo-nent
internet -
dbServer C2 500
Patch Patch a program dbServer C3 10C5
Antivirus Install Antivirussoftware dbServer C4 50
Prot on port Port) between two subnets (SrcSubnet and DstSubnet)
is enabled:
aclNW (SrcSubnet ,DstSubnet , Prot , Port) (3)
A possible mitigation action is updating a firewall rule and dis-
able this communication. The only precondition for applying this
mitigation action is the existence of a firewall between those two
subnets (represented by an isFirewall predicate); thus, the rule repre-
senting this mitigation action is as follows (assuming this mitigation
action’s ID is 1):
aclNW (1, SrcSubnet ,DstSubnet , Prot , Port) : −
isFirewall(FW , SrcSubnet ,DstSubnet). (4)
Given an attack graph node, a query is sent to the Prolog program
based on the node’s description (according to Equation 2). The
results of the query will contain all of the mitigation action IDs that
can be applied to eliminate this node.
The next step is to understand where to perform the mitigation
action in the network. The network position is extracted based
on the position field of each mitigation action (see Section 4) that
instructs how to find the relevant arguments from the Prolog trace.
For example, the position of the mitigation action represented by
Equation 4 is the value of the FW variable in the isFirewall predicate.
Finally, after obtaining the relevant mitigation actions IDs, all of
the corresponding countermeasures are retrieved from the counter-
measures repository and construct the initial node of the search.
The network position of a countermeasure is similar to the position
of its corresponding mitigation action.
5.2 Risk Calculation
The risk in the system is computed using risk equations that are
derived from the attack graph during the pre-processing phase
to the search. The risk is measured by the ease of taking each
attack path. Risk equation is a mathematical representation that
incorporates the risk introduced by the attacker’s actions towards
his/her goal and the possible countermeasures that can thwart these
action.
For example, consider the attack graph in Figure 2, which illus-
trates a scenario of a remote attacker that exploits the lack of access
control between the Internet and a vulnerable database server in
order to crash it. Two vulnerabilities present in the database server:
CVE-2017-8714 with risk score of 0.37 and CVE-2019-2510 with
risk score of 0.65. We consider four types of mitigation actions: (1)
update host-based firewall; (2) install network-based firewall; (3)
patch a program; and (4) install Antivirus software. Table 2 specifies
the position and notation of these countermeasures.
Algorithm 1 describes the process of building the risk equations
for a given attack graph (denoted by AG), that builds the equations
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Node Description
1 dos(attacker, dbServer)
2 Rule 1: DoS by remote exploit
3 netAccess(attacker, attackerHost, dbServer, tcp, 1521)
4 Rule 2: Principal can access a host from a neighbor
5 aclNW(attackerHost, dbServer, tcp, 1521)
6 aclH(attackerHost, admin, attackerHost, dbServer, tcp, 1521)
7 localAccess(attacker, attackerHost, admin)
8 malicious(attacker)
9 vulHost(dbServer, ’CVE-2019-2510’, oracle_mysql, remoteExploit,dos)
10 aclH(dbServer, admin, attackerHost, dbServer, tcp, 1521)
11 networkService(dbServer, oracle_mysql, tcp, 1521, admin)
12 localAccess(attacker, dbServer, admin)
13 execCode(attacker, dbServer, admin)
14 Rule 3: Code execution by local exploit
15 vulHost(dbServer, ’CVE-2017-8714’, windows_server_2012, local-Exploit, completePrivEsc)
16 localService(dbServer, windows_server_2012, admin)
17 Rule 4: Principal has account and can access host via network
18 isLoginService(remote_desktop)
19 aclH(dbServer, admin, attackerHost, dbServer, rdp, 3389)
20 netAccess(attacker, attackerHost, dbServer, rdp, 3389)
21 Rule 2: Principal can access a host from a neighbor
22 aclNW(attackerHost, dbServer, rdp, 3389)
23 aclH(attackerHost, admin, attackerHost, dbServer, rdp, 3389)
24 networkService(dbServer, remote_desktop, rdp, 3389, admin)
25 hasAccount(attacker, dbServer, admin)
26 Rule 5: DoS by code execution
Figure 2: MulVAL example: code execution attack graph.
for each node in the attack graph. It maintains two sets: processed
that keeps all of the nodes that were already processed (i.e, their
equation was constructed), and unprocessed that keeps all of the
remaining nodes. In each iteration a processable node (i.e., a node
that all of its parents are processed) is chosen and its equation is
constructed, until all nodes are processed.
Algorithm 1 Build Risk Equations.
1: processed ← {Risk (n) |n ∈ AGLEAF }
2: unprocessed ← AG \ AGLEAF
3: while !unprocessed .isEmpty() do
4: while !unprocessed .hasProcessableNode() do
5: n ← unprocessed .pop()
6: n .updateMA()
7: if ∀k ∈ nin, k ∈ processed then
8: processed ← processed ∪ {Risk (n)}
9: else
10: unprocessed .push(n)
11: end if
12: end while
13: r emoveCycles(AG)
14: end while
Note that if the attack graph contains cycles, the iteration will
never finish. Cycles are caused by OR nodes that are derived by
some interaction rule and also lead to a pre-condition for the same
rule. To break these cycles, the algorithm identifies unprocessed
OR nodes with more than one parent that at least one of them is
processed, and removes the edges between the unprocessed AND
parents to the unprocessed OR node.
Risk (LEAF ) = ©­«
∏
m∈LEAFCM
mª®¬ · P (LEAF ) (5)
Risk (AND) =
∏
n∈ANDin
Risk (n) (6)
Risk (OR) = ©­«
∏
m∈ORCM
mª®¬ ·
( R∑
i=1
Risk (ORin [i])−∑
i1<i2
Risk (ORin [i1]) · Risk (ORin [i2]) + · · ·+
(−1)R ·
∑
i1<···<iR−1
Risk (ORin [i1]) · ... · Risk (ORin [iR−1])+
(−1)R+1 ·
R∏
i=1
Risk (ORin [i])
)
where, R = |ORin |
(7)
m =
{
0, if countermeasure m is implemented
1, if countermeasure m is not implemented (8)
The implementation of the Risk function is given in Equations 5,
6, 7, and 8. If the given attack graph node represents a vulnerability,
then its risk score is calculated according to the vulnerability’s
CVSS score. Otherwise, the node’s risk score is 1 (we assume than
any other fact can be materialized in any situation).
The risk score of a vulnerability node represents its probability
to be exploited, and is calculated according to the following CVSS
metrics, which provides information about the pre-conditions of
vulnerability exploitation that is not represented in the attack graph:
Risk (n) =
{
AC ·U I, if CVSS v.3
AC · Au, if CVSS v.2 (9)
CVSS provides both qualitative and quantitative values for the
metrics it defines, these values are fixed and are given in the CVSS
specification. The values of the above mentioned exploitability
metrics are in the range [0,1], thus Risk(n) ∈ [0, 1]. This enables us
to consider this score as a probability in future calculations.
Equation 10 presents the calculation of the risk equation for the
goal node (node 1) in the attack graph from Figure 2.
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Risk (n1) = Risk (n26) + Risk (n2)
= (C4 · Risk (n13)) + (Risk (n8) · Risk (n3) · Risk (n9) · Risk (n11) · Risk (n10))
= (C4 · Risk (n14)) + (Risk (n4) · (0.65 ·C3) ·C1)
= (C4 · (Risk (n15) · Risk (n16) · Risk (n12) · Risk (n8))) + (0.65 ·C3 ·C1 ·
· (Risk (n6) · Risk (n5) · Risk (n7)))
= (C4 · ((0.37 ·C5) · Risk (n17))) + (0.65 ·C3 ·C1 · (C2))
= (C4 · (0.13 ·C5 · (Risk (n24) · Risk (n20) · Risk (n25) · Risk (n19) · Risk (n18))))+
+ (0.65 ·C3 ·C1 ·C2)
= (C4 · (0.37 ·C5 · (Risk (n21) ·C1))) + (0.65 ·C3 ·C1 ·C2)
= (C4 · (0.37 ·C5 · (C1 · (Risk (n22) · Risk (n23) · Risk (n7))))) + (0.65 ·C3 ·C1 ·C2)
= (C4 · (0.37 ·C5 · (C1 · (C2)))) + (0.65 ·C3 ·C1 ·C2)
= (0.37 ·C4 ·C5 ·C1 ·C2) + (0.65 ·C3 ·C1 ·C2)
(10)
6 HEURISTIC ALGORITHM
In this section, we present a heuristic approach for finding a counter-
measure plan for a specific system under a given budget limitation
that minimizes the risk in the system as much as possible. This ap-
proach is based on the attack graph-based risk assessment products
described in 5.2. Following is a formal definitions of the problem
and a description of a heuristic solver that solves it.
6.1 Problem Definition
We suggest to model the countermeasure selection problem as a
graph path finding problem and use a heuristic solver to find an
optimal solution as defined by Pohl in [14]. Given a set of coun-
termeasures (CM) and a budget limitation (Budдet ), we define the
path finding problem as follows:
• X = {x1,x2, ...,xn } is the set of nodes (also referred to as
states), where xi = {cmposID |cmID ∈ CM} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n; pos
corresponds to the network position where the countermea-
sure should be deployed.
• E = {(xi ,x j )|xi ,x j ∈ X ,x j ∈ Γ(xi )} is the set of edges
between the nodes in X , where Γ is the mapping between a
node to its successor.
• Γ(x) = {x1,x2, ...,x |xi | |∀k, 1 ≤ k ≤ |xi | : xik = x \ {x[k]}}
is the successor mapping (also referred to as expand function).
The successors of a specific node are created by omitting
one countermeasure each time.
• The initial node contains all of the available and relevant
countermeasures to reduce the risk in the system.
• A terminal node (also referred to as goal node) is a node x
such that Cost(x) = ∑ |x |i=1Cost(x[i]) ≤ Budдet ; i.e., the cost
of deploying the countermeasure plan it represents stands
within the budget limitation.
• f (x) = д(x) + h(x) reflects the estimated risk to the system
under the deployment of a subset of the countermeasures in
x (also referred to as f-value); where д(x) is the risk to the
system under the deployment of all countermeasures in x
(also referred to as g-value), and h(x) is an estimation of the
risk added by removing countermeasures from x in order to
comply with the given budget limitation (also referred to as
h-value).
Algorithm 2 A* Solver
1: Inputs:
2: RiskEq ← RiskEquations
3: init ial ← RelevantCountermeasures
4: B ← Budget
5: Initialize:
6: OpenList ← Pr ior ityQueue()
7: ClosedList ← []
8: procedure A*-Solver(RiskEq , init ial , B)
9: OpenList .add (init ial )
10: while !OpenList .isEmpty() do
11: plan ← OpenList .poll ()
12: if plan ∈ ClosedList then
13: continue
14: end if
15: if Cost (plan) ≤ B then
16: return plan
17: end if
18: ClosedList .append (plan)
19: for each cm ∈ plan do
20: newPlan ← plan \ {cm }
21: if !(newPlan ∈ OpenList )&&!(newPlan ∈ ClosedList ) then
22: OpenList .add (newPlan)
23: end if
24: end for
25: end while
26: end procedure
6.2 Heuristic Solver
To solve the path finding problem defined above and find an optimal
countermeasure plan, we used the A* algorithm. A* is a best-first
search algorithm that aims to find a path from a given initial node
to a goal node with the smallest possible cost (i.e., the sum of the
path’s edges cost is the smallest). In our context, the sum of a path
corresponds to the risk in the system under the deployment of the
plan represented by the goal node; i.e., each edge corresponds to the
new risk introduced to the system by omitting a countermeasure.
To perform the search, the algorithm maintains two sets: open
list and closed list. The closed list contains all of the nodes that
were already selected to participate in a path, while the open list
holds all of the potential nodes to continue a path. In each iteration,
the algorithm selects the best node from the open list and adds it to
its corresponding path. It also expands the open list with all of the
candidate nodes to continue this path (i.e., the result of applying the
expand function on the selected node). The open list is implemented
as a priority queue that sorts the nodes by their f-value. Algorithm 2
presents the A* solver for the countermeasure selection problem.
Note that A* can advance in multiple paths simultaneously, while
guided by the f-values towards the best solution. In our context,
the f-value of a node represents the estimated risk in the system
under the deployment of a subseset of the plan represented by the
node, which cost is equal or lower than the given budget.
To help further guide the search towards a cost-effective solution,
the open list is sorted as follows:
(1) by the f-value – the lower the better; the plan that can be re-
duced while introducing as little risk as possible is preferred.
(2) by the g-value – the higher the better; if the estimate risk
introduced by a subset of two plans is similar, the plan that
already introduces the greater risk is preferred (this implies
that the risk introduced by removing countermeasures is
smaller, thus closer to a goal).
(3) by the deployment cost – the lower the better; if two plans
have the exact same risk estimation, the cheaper plan is
preferred, since it is closer the budget.
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The f-value is calculated based on the current risk in the system
(g-value) and the estimated risk to be introduces to the system
by removing countermeasures from the current plan towards the
budget limitation (h-value). The h-value is computed in two steps
as follows:
(1) Estimate the minimal amount of countermeasures to re-
move: given a node n = {Cj = cmposID |∀cmID ∈ CM}, sort in
descending order the deployment costs of the participating coun-
termeasures: costsn = {Cost(Cj )|∀Cj ∈ n}, and count the top coun-
termeasures (denoted by X ) required to remove in order to reduce
the current plan’s cost to the budget.
(2) Estimate theminimal risk introduced by removingX coun-
termeasures: given the same node n, we define: n−Cj = n \ {Cj },
which is essentially a version of the plan n after removing the
countermeasure Cj . Then, for each Cj ∈ n we compute the risk
introduced by removing each of the countermeasures in n: risksn =
{∆Cjn = Risk(n−Cj ) −Risk(n)|∀Cj ∈ n}, and sort them in ascending
order. Finally, the minimal risk estimated to be added to the system
is the sum of the top X values in risksn .
We demonstrated the heuristic calculation using the attack graph
in Figure 2. Consider the plan n = {C3,C4,C5}, and a maximal
deployment budget of $50. First, the costs of n’s countermeasures
(as specified in Table 2) are sorted in descending order: costsn =
{50, 10, 10}; the total deployment cost of n is $70. If we were to
remove the countermeasure that costs $50 (i.e.,C4) from n, the new
plan’s deployment cost will correspond to the budget (70 − 50 =
20 ≤ 50). Thus, at least one countermeasure should be removed,
i.e., X = 1.
Second, we compute the risk differences (∆Cjn , j ∈ {3, 4, 5}) ac-
cording to Equation 10:
n = {C3, C4, C5 }, Risk (n) = (0.37 · 0 · 0 · 1 · 1) + (0.65 · 0 · 1 · 1)
n−C3 = {C4, C5 }, Risk (n−C3 ) = (0.37 · 0 · 0 · 1 · 1) + (0.65 · 1 · 1 · 1)
n−C4 = {C3, C5 }, Risk (n−C4 ) = (0.37 · 1 · 0 · 1 · 1) + (0.65 · 0 · 1 · 1)
n−C5 = {C3, C4 }, Risk (n−C5 ) = (0.37 · 0 · 1 · 1 · 1) + (0.65 · 0 · 1 · 1)
∆
C3
n = 0.65, ∆
C4
n = 0, ∆
C5
n = 0
According to the above computation, we get that: risksn =
{0, 0, 0.65}. Thus the minimal risk for removing one countermea-
sure from plan n is 0, i.e. h(n) = 0.
Note that this heuristic is admissible. When assessing the risk
to be added by a one-countermeasure reduced plan, we essentially
inspect the effect of each countermeasure individually, which can
be lower or equal to the effect of multiple countermeasures. This
ensures to not over-estimate the risk introduced. Considering the
removal of all possible combinations of countermeasures in X is
computationally heavy and thus not feasible.
7 EVALUATION
To demonstrate and evaluate our proposed countermeasure selec-
tion process, we modeled the IT network presented in Figure 3,
which contains vulnerabilities that both an external and internal
attacker can exploit. We generated an attack graph illustrating all of
the different attack paths using MulVAL with our extended model-
ing, and applied the countermeasure selection process for different
budgets. The heuristic search algorithm we applied is A* The fol-
lowing subsections describe the modeled network and attacks, and
present the results of the selection process for different budgets.
7.1 Evaluation Environment
Figure 3 illustrates an organization’s IT network which serves as the
evaluation environment for the proposed countermeasure selection
process. The network consists of five subnets in total:
• DMZ – contains two web servers (Web Server 1 and Web
Server 2), an e-mail server (Email Server) and a database
(DB3). The DMZ is fully accessible from the Internet.
• DB subnet (SubnetDB) – contains the organization’s internal
databases:DB1 andDB2, which contain sensitive information
regarding the organization’s clients.
• Subnets 1-3 – contain four hosts each that represents differ-
ent departments in the organization.
Router R1 connects the DMZ, DB subnet and the internal subnets
(via R2) with the Internet. A vulnerable version of ARP is used
across the organization network for intra-subnet communication.
Note that in the current network setup the DMZ is not configured
properly since there are no restrictions on external access to the
DMZ hosts and there is no separation between the DMZ to the
internal subntes.
Employees are allowed to use FTP to transfer data inside the
internal network (i.e., among hosts in subnets 1-3), and can access
the database servers as part of their work. The database servers
(DB1 and DB2) run Oracle database software and accept requests
on port 1521. Note that DB1 is not patched properly and runs a
vulnerable version of the Oracle database software (CVE-2016-3609),
which allows data theft. In addition, Host11 accepts remote desktop
connections from any location in the network.
Remote operators can use an external host (Support PC) to con-
nect hosts in the DMZ via Telnet for remote operations. The servers
in the DMZ also run vulnerable applications: Web Server 1 runs
a vulnerable Apache HTTP server version (CVE-2005-1344) that
allows arbitrary code execution upon exploitation; and Web Server
2 runs a vulnerable Apache Subversion (CVE-2015-5343) that leads
to denial of service when exploited.
We consider two types of attackers: internal and external. The
internal attacker is located in Host23 that is a part of the internal
network (Subnet2), while the external attacker is located in the
AttackerHost that is connected to the Internet. The external attacker
can infiltrate into the network by exploiting the vulnerability in
Web Server 1 that allows code execution and can grant him/her
with local access to that server, or by obtaining user credentials to
Email Server by eavesdropping the Telnet communication between
SupportPC and Email Server. In both cases the attacker is assumed
to gain at least one user account in advance: host11User, which
allows him/her to open RDP connection to Host 11.
To summarize, the attacker’s goals are as follows:
(1) Steal sensitive information from DB1.
(2) Spoof the communication between two internal hosts (Host12
and Host22) and see the contents of the data transferred.
(3) Read or send fake e-mails by obtaining local access to Email
Server.
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Figure 3: Evaluation environment.
(4) Tamper with the organization’s website by executing mali-
cious code onWeb Server 1.
(5) Deny users from accessing the organization’s Subversion
server (Web Server 2) and disrupt their work.
Table 3 describes all of the ways an attacker can gain access to
each asset in the network.
7.2 Results
To mitigate the risk in the network described above, we consider
the countermeasures specified in Table 4. The costs were assigned
in a way that reflects the complexity and the effort required to
deploy each type of countermeasure. There are four cost levels: $10,
$50, $300, and $1000.
Note that when searching for a plan, the algorithm considers
only countermeasures for which the cost stands within the budget
limitation; e.g., for budget of $100 the algorithm will not consider
host-based IPS as an option, since its cost ($300) is higher than the
specified budget. This means that when evaluating a budget that
corresponds to one of the cost levels, the search space increases.
Moreover, legitimate services (i.e., the HTTP server inWeb Server 1,
the Apache Subversion inWeb Server 1, FTP for data transfer, and
the communication with the database servers) are crucial to the
organization’s operation, thus cannot be blocked; Telnet and RDP
on the other hand, are less critical, thus can be restricted.
We analyze separately the results for external and internal attack
scenarios. The best way to secure the network, for both external
and internal threats, is: (1) patch the vulnerabilities inWeb Server
1, Web Server 2, and DB1; (2) install a network-based IPS on router
R2; and (3) install a network-based firewall to restrict the RDP
communication between the internal subnets and the DMZ and the
Telnet communication between external devices and the DMZ hosts
(or replace with more protected protocol such as SSH, however this
Figure 4: Risk per budget.
countermeasure is currently not modeled). The deployment cost of
this plan is $2030.
We examined the countermeasure plans generated for different
budgets ranging from $10 to $2100. The plans for each tested budget
are presented in Table 5. Figure 4 presents the risk level under the
deployment of each generated plan for each attack scenario. The
plot presents the risk for the plans suggested only for budgets $50-
$1000. Note that the plans for budgets $1100-$2100 also eliminate
completely the risk in the system, thus not included in the plot.
The suggested plans demonstrate the great advantage of using an
attack graph-based risk assessment. The attack graph specifies the
actions that the attacker should take from his/her initial position
to his/her goals. This enables to capture stepping stones that are
common to multiple attack paths and to understand which counter-
measure can eliminate attack paths as soon as possible. One can see
10
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Table 3: Attack vectors in evaluation environment.
aaaaaaaaa
Target Host
Attacker Pos.
Host23 (internal) Attacker Host (external)
Web Server 1 Abuse the free connectivity from the internal subnets to the DMZ 1. Abuse the free connectivity from the Internet to the DMZ2. Exploit a vulnerability inWeb Server 1 and gain local access
Web Server 2 Abuse the free connectivity from the internal subnets to the DMZ Abuse the free connectivity from the Internet1. Gain access to Host11
2. Abuse the free connectivity from the internal subnets to the DMZ
1. Gain access to Email Server orWeb Server 1
2. AccessWeb Server 2 through the LAN
Email Server –
1. Spoof as Support PC
2. Abuse the unencrypted Telnet communication to steal the user’s credentials
3. Connect with Email Server via Telnet using the stolen credentials
DB1
1. Abuse the free connectivity from the internal subnets to the SubnetDB
2. Exploit the vulnerability in DB1
1. Gain access to Host11
2. Abuse the free connectivity from the internal subnets to the SubnetDB
3. Exploit the vulnerability in DB1
Host11
1. Abuse the free connectivity between the internal subnets
2. Use host11User account (obtained in advance) to log in Host11 via remote desktop
1. Gain access toWeb Server 1,Web Server 2, or Email Server
2. Use host11User account (that was obtained in advance) to log in Host11
Table 4: Countermeasures used for evaluation.
Product Type Cost ($)Deploy Update
Cisco Next-Gen Firewall Network-based firewall 1000 10
ZoneAlarm Host-based firewall 300 10
Snort Network-based IPS 1000 10
Wazuh Host-based IPS 300 10
McAfee Antivirus Antivirus 50 –Kaspersky Antivirus
Various Patch – 10
that as the budget increases, the algorithm chooses the countermea-
sure not only by the amount of risk they mitigate and cost, but also
according to the attack steps; i.e., the algorithm strives to block the
attack as early as possible. For example, consider budgets $10-$20,
which permit patching/updating one or two devices. The plan for
budget $10, in both scenarios, includes patching only Web Server 1
since it introduces the highest amount of risk. However, the plans
for budget $20 differ.For the external attacker, the DMZ servers (Web
Server 1, Web Server 2, and Email Server) are the stepping stones in
his/her way towards the internal network; thus, in this scenario,
the risk they introduce is higher compared to the vulnerabilities in
the external and the algorithm suggest to further patch Web Server
2. On the other hand, in the internal attack scenario, the attacker is
more accessible to the internal hosts, thus the algorithm suggest to
further patch DB1. This is also evident in the plans suggested for
budget $400. For both scenarios, patching Web Server 1, Web Server
2, and DB1 eliminate most of the attack vectors. In the internal
attack scenario, the only attack goal that survives the patching is
spoofing the communication between Host12 and Host 22, since
the attacker can still log in to Host 11 (using RDP) and execute
the attack; while in the external attack scenario, the attacker can
still exploit the vulnerable communication with the Email Server
to compromise it, and also to further execute the spoofing attack.
As can be seen in the results, the algorithm succeed to capture this
information and suggested to extend the plan with a host-based
firewall on Host11 to restrict RDP connections and host-based IPS
on Email Server accordingly.
Note that as the budget increases, the plans also become redun-
dant (i.e., contain several countermeasures that tackle the same
vulnerability). These redundancies suggest to protect the system’s
assets with multiple layers of protection.
For example, besides patching a specific vulnerability in Web
Server 1, the code execution can be detected by antivirus software;
thus, starting from budget of $100, installing antivirus software
on Web Server 1 is included in the suggested plans together with
patching it. Another example is restricting the incoming/outgoing
communication to/from hosts that expose vulnerable services. The
suggested plans for budget $800 include host-based firewalls. In the
internal scenario, a firewall forWeb Server 1 is suggested to restrict
its RDP communication with Host11, in addition to suggesting to
install firewall on Host11 to restrict incoming RDP connections.
In the external scenario, it is suggested to restrict the outgoing
Telnet communication from the Support PC by a host-based firewall
on top of installing host-based IPS on the Email Server to identify
suspicious logins.
Another interesting result is the plan suggested for budget $300.
In the internal scenario, the only attack goal that survives the patch-
ing is spoofing the communication between Host12 and Host 22,
since the attacker can still log in to Host 11 (using RDP) and ex-
ecute the attack. To thwart this attack, a host-based firewall can
be installed on Host 11 to prevent RDP connections. On the other
hand, in the external scenario, the attacker’s access to the internal
subnets depends solely on exploiting the vulnerabilities in the DMZ
servers. At this point, only Email Server is not patched and can
grant the attacker access to the internal network. This attack vector
can be eliminated by installing a host-based IPS on Email Server.
As mentioned above, host-based firewall on Host11 (for the inter-
nal scenario) and host-based IPS on Email Server (for the external
scenario) are the two countermeasures that can eliminate all of the
remaining risk in the system after patching all possible vulnera-
bilities (i.e., the plan for budget $30). However, the three patches
reduces more risk than just a firewall or IPS, thus the algorithm
suggested patching over firewall or IPS. The reason that the plan
doesn’t include antivirus software as in the plans for $100-$200,
is the fact that these plans have the same f-value and g-value (be-
cause they cover the same vulnerabilities and are within the budget
limitation), thus the cheapest plan is preferred (see subsection 6.2).
The plans for budget $2100 contain many of the countermea-
sures we expected to see; however, the algorithm didn’t suggest on
the expected network-based solutions. The plan suggested for the
internal scenario includes: all three patches, both antivirus software
for Web Server 1, host-based firewalls for Host11 and WebServer1 to
restrict RDP connections to Host11, and a network-based firewall
between Subnet2 and Subnet1 (also to restrict RDP connections to
11
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Table 5: Recommended plans for each budget.
Budget ($) Internal Attacker (cost $) External Attacker (cost $)
10 PatchWebServer 1 (10)
20 PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 (20) PatchWebServer 1 , PatchWebServer 2 (20)
30
PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 (30) PatchWebServer 1 , PatchWebServer 2 , PatchDB1 (30)40
50
100 PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 (80)
200 PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 , AV
WebServer 1
1 (130)
300 PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 (30)
400
PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 ,
HB − FW Host11 (380)
PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 ,
HB − I PSEmailServer (380)
500
PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 ,
HB − FW Host11 , AVWebServer 11 (430)
PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 ,
HB − I PSEmailServer , AVWebServer 11 (430)
600
700
800
PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 ,
HB − FW Host11 , AVWebServer 11 , HB − FWWebServer 1 (730)
PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 ,
HB − I PSEmailServer , AVWebServer 11 , HB − FW Suppor tPC (730)
900
1000
1100 PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 ,
HB − I PSEmailServer , AVWebServer 11 , HB − FW Suppor tPC ,
HB − FW Host11 (1030)
1200
1300
1400 PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 ,
HB − I PSEmailServer , AVWebServer 11 , HB − FW Suppor tPC ,
HB − FW Host11 , HB − FWWebServer 1 (1330)
1500
1600
1700
PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 ,
HB − I PSEmailServer , AVWebServer 11 , HB − FW Suppor tPC ,
HB − FW Host11 , HB − FWWebServer 1 HB − FW EmailServer (1630)
1800
PatchWebServer 1 , PatchDB1 , PatchWebServer 2 , AVWebServer 12 ,
HB − FW Host11 , AVWebServer 11 , HB − FWWebServer 1 ,
NB − FW Subnet2−Subnet1 (1730)
1900
2000
2100
Host11. The plan suggested for the external scenario includes: all
three patches, both antivirus software forWeb Server 1, a host-based
IPS for Email Server, host-based firewalls for Support PC and Email
Server (to restrict Telnet), Host11 andWeb Server 1 (to restrict RDP).
The network modeling we used to generate the attack graph con-
siders firewalls to control the communication between only two
subnets. Thus our approach proposes to place a network-based
firewall between the Internet and DMZ, and between the DMZ
and Subnet 1. Since there are only three types of communication to
block between the Internet and DMZ, the algorithm prefers to place
three host-based solutions (that cost $900) over a network-based
solution (that costs $1000). A network-based firewall solution was
nor selected to control the communication between the Internet
and DMZ due to its cost.
Note that currently there is no preference for countermeasure of
the same type; e.g., one antivirus software is not preferred over the
other, thus the algorithm recommendation on the specific antivirus
software is random. This can be changed by introducing preference
criterion to the countermeasure modeling and integrating it in the
risk assessment or during the search.
7.2.1 Attack graph regeneration vs. risk equations. Unlike other
methods (e.g., [3, 10, 16]), we avoid regenerating the attack graph
when evaluating the effectiveness of a countermeasure plan, since
it is computationally heavy. Instead, we suggest to represent the
attack graph and the countermeasures that can eliminate each
node as mathematical equations, where the variables correspond
to the implementation of each possible countermeasure, and just
Figure 5: Calculating risk using equations vs. regenerating
attack graph.
substitute them with suitable values according to a given plan (see
Subsection 5.2).
Figure 5 illustrates the difference in the execution time for calcu-
lating the risk when using our approach and regeneration of the
attack graph under different plans. We measured the attack graph
regeneration time by executing the MulVAL tool (as we do in the
risk assessment phase) with various input files simulating the ap-
plication of different countermeasure plans, and took the minimal
time as reference. This means that computing the risk for each
expanded node during the search will take at least this minimal
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time measurement. Note the this measurement is an under estima-
tion of the real attack graph generation time. As can be observed,
regenerating the attack graph to compute the risk is significantly
less efficient than our suggested approach.
7.2.2 Attack graph-based vs. traditional risk assessment. Traditional
risk assessment process, such as performed in [18], is mostly man-
ual. The first step is to gather information about the network and
its vulnerabilities. This information is crossover with public data
sources, e.g., NVD and CVSS. Next, a threat analysis is performed.
This step includes identifying potential threat sources and asso-
ciate the discovered vulnerabilities to threats. The likelihood of a
risk acting over a vulnerability is estimated based on the organiza-
tion’s history. Finally, a list of generic countermeasures is generated.
Each countermeasure has its cost (that consist of purchase cost,
operational cost, training cost, and man power) and a score that
represents its impact on the vulnerabilities that was found (which is
usually the base CVSS score). The countermeasures are chosen by
the severity scaling of vulnerabilities; i.e., the vulnerabilities with
the highest CVSS score are treated first.
The evaluation network contains four vulnerabilities with CVEs:
(1) CVE-1999-0667 with CVSS score 10; (2) CVE-2005-1344 with
CVSS score 7.5; (3) CVE-2015-5343 with CVSS score 7.6; and (4)
CVE-2016-3609 with CVSS score 9. Moreover, the Telnet protocol
is vulnerable since it is not encrypted. This is a vulnerability in the
protocol’s design, thus doesn’t have a specific CVE and required to
be scored by an expert. Since it allows stealing users’ credentials, it
is reasonable to be assigned with the maximum score of 10.
If we were to perform a traditional risk assessment to the eval-
uation network, we would choose to fix the vulnerabilities in the
following order: (1) CVE-1999-0667 and Telnet; (2) CVE-2016-3609;
(3) CVE-2015-5343; and lastly CVE-2005-1344. This means that we
will first fix the vulnerabilities on the internal hosts and only then
the vulnerability in the DMZ host. However, when considering
an external attacker, many of the attack vector can be eliminated
by fixing the DMZ hosts vulnerabilities, which have less severely
ranked.
The most severe vulnerability is the ARP spoof (CVE-1999-0667).
To fix this, the protocol should be replaced, or defense mechanisms
should be installed all on hosts in all subnets. Fixing this vulnera-
bility is important but also entails high expenses. However, note
that in order for an external attacker to reach the internal network,
he/she is required to first gain access to one of the hosts in the DMZ.
Thus, the attacker can be prevented from reaching the internal net-
work by fixing the vulnerabilities in these hosts, although most of
them are less severe than the internal network vulnerabilities. Note
that fixing these vulnerabilities is also likely to be less expensive,
since it requires to patch two hosts and to change or restrict the
communication with a specific host.
These insights cannot be reached without considering the net-
work topology, thus choosing countermeasures based just on vul-
nerabilities’ severity doesn’t guarantee an optimal plan. This is
exactly the missing information that is captured by attack graphs.
Since attack graphs illustrate the paths from the attacker’s initial
position to his/her goal, it captures the fact that fixing the DMZ
hosts first will eliminate the paths to the internal hosts (this step
will appear at the beginning of the path); and this is reflected in the
plans that our algorithm provides.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We present a heuristic approach towards the security countermea-
sure selection problem. Our approach uses an attack graph-based
risk assessment process that enables countermeasure selection that
consider the network topology, the vulnerabilities found, and the
interactions between them; thus provides more accurate and ap-
plicable suggestions. Moreover, we provide an automated method
for identifying which countermeasure can eliminate each step in
each attack path. Our approach also explicitly specifies the network
position where each countermeasure should be applied.
We model the countermeasure selection problem as a graph path
finding problem and used a heuristic solver (A*) to find an optimal
solution: a plan (i.e., set of countermeasures and their deployment
position) that minimizes the risk in the system as much as possible
within the given budget limitation. The results show that our ap-
proach was able to provide solution very close to our expectations.
Moreover, since we use an attack graph-based risk assessment, the
plans suggested strive to block each attack path as soon as possible
(i.e., in its initial stages). The proposed plans are also redundant
when the budget permits, and may provide suggestions for multiple
countermeasures that tackle the same vulnerability or attack path
to enhance the security of the system.
Currently, our approach filters out countermeasures that contra-
dict the organization policy (i.e, not blocking ports of legitimate
services). In future work, we aim to extend it to consider operators’
preferences. This can be done as part of the relevant countermea-
sure identification phase (e.g., in case that the operator doesn’t
want to deploy a specific countermeasure on a specific host), or
by introducing another cost component to make one countermea-
sure preferable over the other during the search. Another aspect
that should taken into account is shared costs (e.g., one antivirus
licence can cover multiple hosts), which significantly affects the
algorithm’s decisions.
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A MITIGATION ACTIONS - EXAMPLE
For demonstrating the definition of mitigation actions correspond-
ing to the vulHost and aclNW predicates, consider the predicate
and rules in Listing 1.
Step 1: create defense mechanism set. As specified in Subsec-
tion 4.2, we consider the following: host and network based fire-
walls, host and network based IPS, software patch, and antivirus
software, i.e.:
DM = {HB−FW ,NB−FW ,HB−IPS,NB−IPS, Patch,Antivirus}
Step 2: match defense mechanisms to predicates.Host vulner-
abilities (vulHost) can be fixed by patching the vulnerable software
or by capturing and blocking the abnormal behavior indicating on
that vulnerability by a network-based IPS, thus:
DMvulHost = {Patch,NB − IPS}
Connectivity among hosts across the network (aclNW ) can be
controlled by network-based firewalls, thus:
DMaclNW = {NB − FW }
Step 3: represent the scenarios to be cancelled. vulHost is a
primitive predicate and thus:
p
pre
vulHost = ϕ
p
post
vulHost = {vulHost(Host ,VulID, Proд,Ranдe,Consequense)}
SvulHost = {(ppostvulHost ,p
pre
vulHost })
On the other hand, aclNW is a multi-rule, thus we first have to
group together the rules that represent similar scenarios:
д1aclNW = {r1aclNW , r2aclNW }
д2aclNW = {r3aclNW }
д3aclNW = {r4aclNW }
д4aclNW = {r5aclNW }
Groupд1aclNW represents rules for host to host connectivity,д
2
aclNW
represents rules for subnet to host, д3aclNW represents rules for
host to subnet, and д4aclNW represents the rule that indicate on
subnet to subnet. The pre-conditions of each group are as follows:
(д1aclNW )pre ={located(SrcHost , SrcSubnet , ipSubnet),
located(DstHost ,DstSubnet , ipSubnet)}
(д2aclNW )pre = {located(DstHost ,DstSubnet , ipSubnet)}
(д3aclNW )pre = {located(SrcHost , SrcSubnet , ipSubnet)}
(д4aclNW )pre = ϕ
Note that there are no pre-conditions for the fourth group since it
is essentially the primitive representation of this predicate, thus it
is handled as in the first case. Finally, the scenarios for aclNW are:
SaclNW = {(aclNW (SrcHost ,DstHost , Protocol , Port), (д1aclNW )pre ),
(aclNW (SrcSubnetOrHost ,DstHost , Protocol , Port), (д2aclNW )pre ),
(aclNW (SrcHost ,DstHostOrSubnet , Protocol , Port), (д3aclNW )pre ),
(aclNW (SrcHostOrSubnet ,DstHostOrSubnet , Protocol , Port), (д4aclNW )pre )}
Step 4: create mitigation action instances. As specified in step
2, the possible mitigation actions are: patching, NIPS, and network-
based firewall. In order to deploy an IPS or patch a program there
must exist a suitable rule or patch. Thus the following are the pre-
conditions for deploying IPS and install a patch correspondingly:
ipsRule(VulID,RuleID)
hasPatch(Proдram,VulID, PatchID)
Moreover, IPS and firewall are mechanisms that might require
installation, or just an update (if already installed). We distinguish
between these cases by indicating in the pre-conditions on the
existence of such components using the following predicates:
isFirewall(FW , SrchSubnet ,DstSubnet)
isIPS(IPS, Subnet)
NIPS however, requires additional pre-conditions to be deployed,
such that the host it is installed in should be a gateway of the subnet
it monitors; this is represented by the following predicate:
isGateway(Host , Subnet)
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1 vulHost(Host, VulID, Prog, Range, Consequense).
2
3 /* aclNW1 - connectivity within subnet */
4 aclNW(SrcHost, DstHost, Protocol, Port) :-
5 located(SrcHost, Subnet, ipSubnet),
6 located(DstHost, Subnet, ipSubnet).
7 /* aclNW2 - connectivity between subnets */
8 aclNW(SrcHost, DstHost, Protocol, Port):-
9 located(SrcHost, SrcSubnet, ipSubnet),
10 located(DstHost, DstSubnet, ipSubnet),
11 aclNW(SrcSubnet, DstSubnet, Protocol, Port).
12 /* aclNW3 - connectivity between host and subnet */
13 aclNW(SrcSubnetOrHost, DstHost, Protocol, Port):-
14 located(DstHost, DstSubnet, ipSubnet),
15 aclNW(SrcSubnetOrHost, DstSubnet, Protocol, Port).
16 /* aclNW4 - connectivity between subnet and host */
17 aclNW(SrcHost, DstHostOrSubnet, Protocol, Port):-
18 located(SrcHost, SrcSubnet, ipSubnet),
19 aclNW(SrcSubnet, DstHostOrSubnet, Protocol, Port).
20 /* aclNW5 - derivation from primitive */
21 aclNW(SrcSubnet, DstSubnet, Protocol, Port):-
22 aclNW_p(SrcSubnet, DstSubnet, Protocol, Port).
Listing 1: Example vulHost and aclNW predicates.
Table 6 presents all of the mitigation actions instances created in
this process. Mitigation actions 1-4 are relevant to the vulHost pred-
icate, while 5-12 to aclNW predicate. More specifically, actions 5-6
represent д1aclNW , 7-8 represent д
2
aclNW , 9-10 represent д
3
aclNW ,
and 11-12 represent д4aclNW .
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Table 6: Mitigation actions for vulHost and aclNW predicates.
ID Type Description Pre-conditions Post-conditions
1 Patch Patch the vulnerable program hasPatch(Proдram, Vul ID, PatchID) vulHost (Host, Vul ID, Proдram, Ranдe, Consequence)
2 NB-IPS Place new IPS in the gateway
ipsRule(Vul ID, RuleID)
vulHost (Host, Vul ID, Proдram, Ranдe, Consequence)!is I PS (I PS, Subnet )
isGateway(I PS, SubnetA)
is I PS (I PS, SubnetA)
located(Host, SubnetA, ipSubnet )
3 NB-IPS Update rules of an existing IPS
ipsRule(Vul ID, RuleID)
vulHost (Host, Vul ID, Proдram, Ranдe, Consequence)is I PS (I PS, Subnet )
located (Host, Subnet, ipSubnet )
4 NB-IPS Connect subnet to existing IPS
ipsRule(Vul ID, RuleID)
vulHost (Host, Vul ID, Proдram, Ranдe, Consequence)
is I PS (I PS, Subnet )
isGateway(I PS, SubnetA)
is I PS (I PS, SubnetA)!is I PS (I PS, SubnetA)
located(Host, SubnetA, ipSubnet )
5 NB-FW Place new firewall between the subnets of SrcHostand DstHost
!isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet ) aclNW (SrcHost, DstHost, Protocol, Por t )
located (SrcHost, SrcSubnet, ipSubnet )
isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet )
located(DstHost, DstSubnet )
6 NB-FW Update existing firewall between the subnets of
SrcHost and DstHost
isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet )
aclNW (SrcHost, DstHost, Protocol, Por t )located (SrcHost, SrcSubnet, ipSubnet )
located(DstHost, DstSubnet )
7 NB-FW Place new firewall between SrcSubnet and DstHost’ssubnet
!isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet ) aclNW (SrcSubnet, DstHost, Protocol, Por t )
located(DstHost, DstSubnet, ipSubnet ) isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet )
8 NB-FW Update existing firewall between SrcSubnet and
DstHost’s subnet
isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet )
aclNW (SrcSubnet, DstHost, Protocol, Por t )
located(DstHost, DstSubnet, ipSubnet )
9 NB-FW Place new firewall between DstSubnet and SrcHost’ssubnet
!isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet ) aclNW (SrcHost, DstSubnet, Protocol, Por t )
located (SrcHost, SrcSubnet, ipSubnet ) isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet )
10 NB-FW Update existing firewall between DstSubnet and
SrcHost’s subnet
isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet )
aclNW (SrcHost, DstSubnet, Protocol, Por t )
located (SrcHost, SrcSubnet, ipSubnet )
11 NB-FW Place new firewall between SrcSubnet and
DstSubnet
!isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet ) aclNW (SrcSubnet, DstSubnet, Protocol, Por t )
isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet )
12 NB-FW Update existing firewall between SrcSubnet and Dst-Subnet isF ir ewall (FW , SrcSubnet, DstSubnet ) aclNW (SrcHost, DstSubnet, Protocol, Por t )
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